Abstract: Drawing on recently completed firm-level surveys in Bangladesh, China, Ethiopia, and Pakistan, this paper investigates the relationship between investment climate and firm performance. These standardized surveys of large, random samples of firms in common sectors reveal that objective measures of the investment climate vary significantly across countries and across locations within these countries. The authors focus primarily on measures of the time or monetary cost of different bottlenecks (e.g., days to clear goods through customs, days to get a telephone line, sales lost to power outages, time spent dealing with government bureaucracy). For many of these costs, the obstacles are lower in China than in Bangladesh or Pakistan, which in turn are superior to Ethiopia. There is also systematic variation across cities within countries. The authors estimate a production function for garment firms and show that total factor productivity is systematically related to the investment climate indicators. Factor returns (wages for a given quality of human capital and rate of profit) are also higher where investment climate is better. These higher returns then have dynamic effects: accumulation and growth at the firm level is higher where investment climate is good.
Introduction
The developing world contains both the fastest-growing and slowest-growing locations on earth. If one ranks countries by 1990 per capita GDP and looks at subsequent growth rates, one finds that virtually all rich-country growth rates are in a tight band between 1 and 3, whereas poor-country growth rates vary from highly negative up to China's spectacular 8 percent per annum (figure 1). Within countries as well there are often large differences in growth rates of different regions or cities. This is the general puzzle with which we are concerned: why some locations in the developing world grow so rapidly, while others stagnate. There is not likely to be a single explanation of this phenomenon. We are going to explore the hypothesis that variations in "investment climate" across locations can explain much of this variation in growth rates.
What we mean by investment climate is the institutional, policy, and regulatory environment in which firms operate -factors that influence the link from sowing to reaping. If the local government is highly bureaucratic and corrupt; if government's own provision or regulation of infrastructure and financial services is inefficient so that firms cannot get reliable services -then returns on potential investments will be low and uncertain, and one would not expect much accumulation and growth in these environments. On the other hand, in developing locations that create a good governance environment, returns and accumulation should be high.
This concept of investment climate is closely related to what some authors in the macro literature have called "high-quality institutions" (Knack and Keefer 1995, Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 2000) or "social infrastructure" (Hall and Jones, 1999) . The latter authors, for example, write:
Our hypothesis is that differences in capital accumulation, productivity, and therefore output per worker are fundamentally related to differences in social infrastructure across countries. By social infrastructure we mean the institutions and government policies that determine the economic environment within which individuals accumulate skills, and firms accumulate capital and produce output. A social infrastructure favorable to high levels of output per worker provides an environment that supports productive activities and encourages capital accumulation, skill acquisition, invention, and technology transfer….Social institutions to protect the output of individual productive units from diversion are an essential component of a social infrastructure favorable to high levels of output per worker... Regulations and laws may protect against diversion, but they all too often constitute the chief vehicle of diversion in an economy.
This idea has been investigated in the cross-country studies noted above using proxies for strength of property rights and government efficiency. This literature is suggestive, but suffers from three problems: (1) there are not that many countries in the world so that the statistical results are not that robust; 1 (2) the proxies used as explanatory variables do not provide much specific guidance about what countries need to do to improve their investment climates; and (3) using national-level data assumes that the investment climate is the same across locations within a country, when in fact there may be interesting variation based on local governance.
Our contribution is to go down to the firm level to collect data on how institutional and policy weaknesses actually affect firms. We have collaborated with in-country partners on large, random surveys of establishments in Bangladesh (924), China (1500), Ethiopia (424), and Pakistan (965). These surveys include data on inputs and outputs, as well as on objective aspects of the investment climate. We describe these in more detail below, but in general we are interested in aspects of the environment such as how long it takes to get goods through customs, how long it takes to get a phone line, or how frequent and disruptive are power outages. We developed the questionnaire through pilot testing and with input from firms about the key bottlenecks that they face. We recognize, however, that it is possible that there are important aspects of the investment climate that we have omitted. Note that the four countries reflect the 1 On the lack of robustness of cross-country empirical results, see Levine and Renelt (1992) ; Rodriguez and Rodrik (2000) ; Dollar and Kraay (2003) .
puzzle that we start with: China, Bangladesh, and Pakistan had similar per capita GDP in 1990, but in the subsequent decade their growth rates were 8.0 percent, 3.3 percent, and 1.1 percent, respectively. They are also all major exporters of garments and other labor-intensive manufactures. So, it is natural to inquire why their performances have been so diverse. Ethiopia is a distinctly poorer country than the other three; its growth rate in the 1990s was 1.5 percent.
In the next section we present the analytical framework for this study. We draw on models from empirical IO (industrial organization), trade theory, and growth theory. The story we want to explore is the following: if there are systematic differences in investment climate across locations, then for the plants that exist in these locations, total factor productivity should be related to investment climate. Bureaucratic harassment, power outages, etc. result in less value added being produced from the same capital and labor in different locations. We then turn to trade theory and argue that since these countries are exporting similar products (have the same comparative advantage), poor investment climate locations would have to have lower wages and return to capital in order to compete. To foreshadow our results, if Bangladesh has a worse investment climate than China, it can still export garments, but it will need lower wages and lower return to capital in order to do so at the same prices as Chinese exporters. Turning to growth theory, it is these potential differences in rates of return to accumulation that lead to the prediction that locations with poor institutions and policies will have lower rates of accumulation and slower growth. These models provide a framework for investigating whether objective measures of the investment climate are related to six outcome variables that we obtain from the firm surveys: estimates of total factor productivity, average wages (controlling for human capital), rate of return on fixed assets, and growth rates of output, fixed assets, and employment.
We note that there are other, not mutually exclusive hypotheses, that could account for why locations perform so differently -in particular that natural geography and/or agglomeration economies could be important.
In section 3 we describe the firm surveys in more detail and present the main investment climate indicators that we use in the empirical analysis. The surveys are based on stratified random samples of establishments in particular sectors that vary somewhat across the countries.
Garments are covered in all of the countries, as well as some other labor-intensive sectors. In this section we establish that there are statistically significant differences across countries and across locations within countries, in many of the indicators that we collect. We can say with a high degree of confidence that customs clearance is faster in China than in Bangladesh, and faster in Bangladesh than in Pakistan. If our prior is that time delays and service breakdowns are bad things, then we can say that China looks the best of the four countries on many of the measures (fast customs clearance, fast access to new phone lines, few power outages). However, one of the interesting things that emerges is that each location tends to have its relative strengths and weaknesses. In China, for example, the state-owned banking system is providing poor services to the firms (largely privately owned) in our sample. Also, China is relatively bureaucratic with a large number of factory inspections per year compared to other countries.
In section 4 we estimate a production function for garments, which we take as a relatively homogeneous product that each of these countries exports. Following the empirical IO literature we address the potential correlation of inputs with the error term in the production function. We then take the residuals of the production function as estimates of TFP and show that across firms In section 5 we estimate equations for the other outcome variables of interest. Here we pool the data across industries in order to get the maximum number of observations, and include industry dummies to account for differences in industry price and output cycles. The growth rates of output, capital stock, and employment are calculated for the two years prior to the survey date. In each case we can estimate an equation and find that the investment climate measures are significant determinants of input and output growth, with plausible magnitudes for the coefficients. In some of these equations the geography variables work fairly well also. In general, it is bad to be far from major markets and far from ports. Large population is associated with faster economic growth. It seems very likely that there is some truth to the stories that emphasize natural geography and agglomeration economies. We do not find manufacturing plants randomly distributed around rural locations. That said, most of the locations we cover are large cities, and many of them are ports, with potential access to the international market.
Nevertheless, locations such as Karachi (Pakistan), Chittagong (Bangladesh), and Tianjin (China) are not performing as well as Guangzhou and Shanghai in China. So, while being a big port city is an advantage, the advantage can easily be undone by poor local governance. The fact that the investment climate indicators are highly significant even after controlling for geography, population, and even country dummies, is consistent with the view that local governance is very important.
Thus, we conclude in the final section that a number of major cities in China have created quite good investment climates, compared to other locations at similar levels of development ten years ago and with similar good potential for access to the international market. The result of this better investment climate is that there is a strong connection between sowing and reaping.
The plants that exist in these good environments produce more value from given capital and labor and thus can pay higher wages and have higher profits. These superior returns then spur greater accumulation, so that the typical plant is rapidly expanding capital stock, employment, and output. Given the large differences in investment climate that we find in our surveys, it is not surprising that growth rates vary so much across these locations.
Analytical Framework
The analytical framework that we have in mind for our investigation of the relationship between investment climate and firm productivity and growth combines elements of theory from industrial organization, trade, and growth.
The empirical IO literature often starts with a simple production function written in logs as:
(1)
where y is gross output, k is capital input, l is labor input, m is material input,ε is an unobserved productivity shock, and i and j index firms and locations. We are working with firms in different countries, but we assume that in a common export sector, such as garments, firms face the same international price for their output. There is a world market price for men's shirts of a certain quality, and all firms are price-takers. We further assume that the countries allow firms in these export sectors to purchase capital equipment and raw materials at world market prices. So, the dollar value of capital and materials and the dollar value of output can be compared across countries. Wages are going to diverge, as we will see below, so the labor input in the production function needs to be in physical rather than value units (e.g., number of workers, adjusted for years of schooling and experience).
In general the coefficients of this production function cannot be estimated consistently with OLS, because there are good reasons to think that the productivity shock is correlated with at least some of the inputs. Olley and Pakes (1996) divide the productivity shock into two components, ω , which is a state variable that affects the firm's decisions, while ε is a pure shock that does not.
Suppose that labor is adjusted relatively easily, and capital not. In this context, a good productivity state leads the firm to use more labor -that is, labor input is correlated with part of the unobserved error. An OLS estimate that does not adjust for this will have biased estimates for the coefficients of both labor and capital. We are going to use the technique introduced by Levinsohn and Petrin (2000) to address this endogeneity problem and arrive at consistent estimates of the coefficients of (2).
Where firms are producing in the same location, it makes sense to think of them facing the same basic investment climate: quality of public infrastructure, efficiency of regulation, degree of corruption, access to financial services. However, we want to explore the idea that these factors vary to a large extent across countries (and even to some considerable extent across cities within developing countries). So, we introduce into the production function a term, A, that captures the influence of the investment climate on production of the firm. A, in turn, we will model as a function of observable indicators of the investment climate, X:
If we have consistent estimates of the parameters of the production function, then we can estimate the effect of investment climate indicators as:
The left-hand-side here is what is conventionally called total factor productivity. We are in effect decomposing TFP into a part that depends on the local investment climate, and a firmspecific productivity shock.
Equation (5) is the first one that we are going to estimate across a sample of garment firms from different countries. Now, foreshadowing our results, suppose that we find that the investment climate is better in China than in Bangladesh, so that China's typical firm is producing more value added than the typical Bangladeshi firm, with the same capital and labor inputs. How then does Bangladesh compete with China? Why would any Bangladeshi firms survive? Here we turn to international trade theory. Schott (2000) finds that the basic Heckscher-Ohlin model of trade explains global production patterns fairly well, provided that we recognize that countries are in different "cones of diversification." In particular, he estimates a labor-abundant cone that includes countries with overall capital-labor ratios up to $5,000. It happens that all of the countries in our sample are in this cone. Thus, they have comparative advantage in the same labor-intensive agricultural and manufacturing products, and tend to import more capital-and skill-intensive items. In this model, these countries in the same cone would have the same factor prices, provided that they all have the same As in their production functions. In the trade literature, differences in the "As" are usually interpreted as differences in technology. But the algebra is the same if we interpret these as differences in investment climate. It is straightforward to introduce into the trade model neutral differences in As across countries. In other words, if investment climate varies across countries and affects different industries to the same extent, then the basic predictions of the trade model go through, with one important change: if China is 20% better than Bangladesh at everything, then prices for capital and labor have to be 20% higher in China than in Bangladesh.
Firms in China and Bangladesh will choose the same techniques, since they face the same relative factor prices. With 20% lower factor prices, Bangladeshi firms will be able to export at the same prices as Chinese firms. So, from trade theory we derive a second equation to estimate:
The average wage will vary across firms based on firm characteristics, Z (eg., average schooling of the firm's workers, average experience) and the local investment climate indicators. This model only makes sense if there is restricted labor mobility across countries, which is clearly the case for the developing countries we consider. It is also necessary that there be restrictions on outflows of capital (otherwise all of the capital would leave Pakistan) -and in fact all of the countries we consider do limit capital outflows.
Finally, we turn to the issue of growth. Ventura (2000) embeds a Heckscher-Ohlin trade model of the kind above, into a Ramses growth model. In the one-sector Ramses growth model, a difference in investment climate in two countries that are otherwise the same would result in a higher return to capital in the good environment and a higher investment and growth rate initially. As capital is accumulated, however, diminishing returns reduce profitability and the growth rate slows down. In the steady state the two countries would have the same growth rate.
Ventura shows that the multi-sector trade model suggests that the transition could be prolonged for the following reason: Imagine that the agricultural sector is the most labor-intensive, and that the "cone" that China, Bangladesh, et al. are in also includes labor-intensive manufactures. The latter are more capital intensive than agriculture, but less capital intensive than other manufactured products.
In this model, if all countries had the same "As" for their production functions, then in general poor countries would grow more rapidly than rich ones. They would have a higher return to capital and would accumulate rapidly. As they did, labor would shift from agriculture to labor-intensive manufactures. As long as the country remains within the "cone," the return to capital would be stable and one would not have the offset to the high growth rate of diminishing returns. Eventually the capital accumulation leads the country to a more capital-abundant cone with lower return to capital. So, in the long run the model performs like the traditional modelbut the model provides a plausible explanation for why the transition is long.
Again, it is straightforward to introduce systematic differences across countries in the As of the production functions. If the investment climate is very poor in Pakistan, then it will not have a high return to capital and no strong incentive to accumulate. (Some capital mobility from rich to poor countries would reinforce this process. If the return to capital is very high in China and very low in Pakistan, then some capital will flow from rich countries to China and accelerate the growth process of labor shifting out of agriculture into labor-intensive manufactures.) This kind of model in which A varies systematically across countries is behind the empirical growth literature, which is trying to explain these differences in terms of institutional, policy, and other variables.
A range of empirical studies [Hall and Jones (1999) , others] find a relationship between long-run growth, on the one hand, and measures of institutional quality, on the other. We are going to do something analogous with firm-level data. In particular, we are going to explore whether at the firm level growth rates of output, capital stock, and employment are systematically related to measures of the investment climate.
To summarize: there are theoretical reasons to expect that a poor investment climate would lead to lower TFP at the firm level, lower factor prices (both lower wages for a given quality of labor and a lower return to capital), and slower growth of capital, employment, and output for the typical firm. The faster growth is a transitional phenomenon, but the transition could be quite long. In any empirical investigation it is useful to think about what kind of evidence would refute the main hypotheses and what kind of competing models might explain the observation that firms are growing much more rapidly in some locations of the developing world than in others. In the next section we are going to explore whether a number of investment climate indicators that we have collected from firms vary systematically across locations. If the indicators do not vary across locations, then they will not be able to explain differences in performance. We then relate the investment climate indicators to six different lefthand-side variables, following the discussion above. The dependent variables are firm-level TFP, average wage, average return to capital, capital stock growth, employment growth, and output growth. To accept the notion that investment climate is important, one would need to find a consistent pattern of relationships between investment climate, on the one hand, and firm productivity, factor prices, and growth rates, on the other. Finally, we will control for other variables that we associate with competing (but not mutually exclusive) hypotheses, especially the idea that agglomeration economies and natural geography are important for explaining the location of production around the world. 
Measuring Investment Climate with Firm-Level Data
The empirical growth literature has used a number of proxy variables that get at different aspects of the investment climate: subjective measures of the strength of the rule of law, expropriation risk, and government effectiveness in providing public services. This approach has the advantage that it can cover a lot of countries and establish a general link from investment climate to growth. The disadvantage of these indicators is that they are subjective and do not provide much specific guidance about how the investment climate affects firms and about which 2 Krugman and Venables (1999) argue that in many lines of production there are advantages to producers locating close together and that these agglomeration economies could explain the concentration of production in certain locations. Limao and Venables (2000) provide cross-country empirical support for this notion. Gallup and Sachs (1999) focus on a different aspect of geography: the debilitating effect of malaria and other diseases and their impact on productivity. In our work we will introduce variables that attempt to capture the importance of being close to markets and major concentrations of population, as highlighted by the Krugman-Venables work. We are not well placed at the moment to look at the geographic factors emphasized in Sachs's recent work, because the locations that we cover in this study do not have major malaria or disease problems. As the investment climate surveys are extended to more locations (surveys for example are underway in Tanzania and Uganda in Africa and in India, including states such as Uttar Pradesh), it will be possible to examine this idea as well.
aspects of the investment climate are especially important. It is for these reasons that we turned to firm-level data to get better measures of the investment climate and a clearer understanding of how it relates to firm performance and growth. At the end of the day, all growth occurs at the firm level (defining firms broadly to include farms and productive households).
The investment climate measures that we are going to present are based on large, random samples of firms in specific sectors in four countries: Bangladesh, China, Ethiopia, and Pakistan. Each of these surveys used somewhat different questions and survey methodologies. Based on this experience, we have developed a common set of objective questions that will be included in all future surveys sponsored by the Bank. Bangladesh, China, Ethiopia, and Pakistan are the first countries to be covered by this common survey instrument. Each survey also uses a similar methodology: a stratified random sample of establishments is drawn in each country. It is stratified first on sub-sector: we want to collect production and investment data from firms producing broadly the same product. The garment sector was covered in each of these countries and is the best example of a relatively homogeneous industry in which we have observations from all four countries and for which we can estimate a production function (in the next section).
The other sectors covered are textiles, leather products, and food products in Bangladesh; business services, IT, electronic equipment and components, consumer appliances, and auto parts in China; textiles, leather goods, food products, and wood products (furniture) in Ethiopia; and textiles, leather goods, food processing, sporting goods, electronics, chemicals, and IT in Pakistan.
The samples are also stratified based on location. The locations covered are Dhaka and Chittagong in Bangladesh; Beijing, Chengdu, Guangzhou, Shanghai, and Tianjin in China; Addis Ababa, Amhara, Oromia, and Tigray in Ethiopia; and Sindh, Punjab, Balochistan, and Northwest Frontier in Pakistan. The sample sizes vary from 424 in Ethiopia, to 976 in Bangladesh, 965 in Pakistan, and 1500 in China.
In each country we worked with a local partner to draw these samples and to train enumerators to visit the establishments. The typical observation is based on a three-hour visit to the factory. Because of the interest and support from the business community in each country, we have been able to attain high levels of cooperation from firms. For example, as a measure of access to finance, there is information on use of overdraft facilities as well as the share of firms that have a bank loan. Within the same theme, the correlation of the indicators is high. Thus, while we will discuss the longer list, in the empirical analysis in the next two sections we decided to focus on five indicators (highlighted in bold in Table 1 ). The five were selected based on being available for all four countries and capturing different key dimensions of the investment climate. We should say at the outset that one potential issue to be aware of is the problem of omitted variables. The list of indicators that we have arrived at has evolved based on interviews with firms, including open-ended questions about the main problems that they face. Nevertheless, it is always possible that something important is overlooked.
As a general measure of the intrusiveness of the public bureaucracy, we ask firms how many times per year they are visited by government inspectors. Obviously some amount of public regulation of safety, health, and environmental conditions is positive for social welfare.
The issue we explore is the extent to which this varies across countries and across locations within countries. In the case of our four countries, for example, Ethiopia (14 days) and Bangladesh (20 days) have less of an intrusive inspection regime than Pakistan (33 days) or China (34 days) ( Table 1 ). The advantage of basing these means on large samples is that the standard error is small (0.59 days) and hence the difference between Bangladesh and Ethiopia, on the one hand, and China and Pakistan, on the other, highly significant statistically. A related question is to ask the firm to estimate how much of management time is spent dealing with government regulation. Again, in China and Pakistan the number is quite high (10-12% of time), compared to only 3.3% in Ethiopia. We have experimented with asking firms to estimate what share of total sales is paid unofficially "to get things done" by a typical firm. In Bangladesh, China, and Pakistan the mean responses were similar -2.2 to 2.5 percent of sales --whereas in Ethiopia firms did not answer the question. Thus, we will focus here on the time cost rather than the corruption cost of a weak bureaucracy.
A question that relates both to bureaucracy in general and to bureaucratic control of access to international markets in particular, is how long it took importing firms to get their last shipment of goods through customs. China comes out best in this category (7.9 days), followed by Bangladesh (11.7), Ethiopia (14.7) and Pakistan (17.2). Note that response to this question is limited to firms that actually import materials, so that the number responding is considerably smaller than the overall sample size (434 firms in China, for example). Nevertheless, standard errors are small, and we can say that China is significantly better than Bangladesh, which in turn is significantly better than Pakistan, in terms of moving goods through customs.
Our experience with this survey work over several years has taught us that reliability of the public power grid is a big concern for firms. We ask firms to estimate the loss in sales owing to power outages. In this group, China is the best (2.0%), significantly better than Bangladesh (3.3%), which in turn is much better than either Pakistan (5.4%) or Ethiopia (5.5%). Given the losses stemming from power failures, many firms respond by running their own generator.
While it not uncommon for large firms in any location to have their own power generators, for small and medium enterprises (SMEs) the cost of maintaining a power generator is quite high and burdensome. Thus, another gauge of the reliability of the power supply is the proportion of firms that have their own generators. The results are similar; the share of firms with their own generator is 42% in the Pakistan sample and only 16% in the China sample. The numbers for firms with their own wells are also nearly identical (44% in Pakistan compared to 16% in China).
Another question that relates to both infrastructure and government bureaucracy, is how many days it took to secure a phone line, for firms that have secured one in the past two years.
Again, China looks relatively good (16 days), followed by Pakistan (42 days), Bangladesh (130 days), and Ethiopia (151). These are all countries in which the public sector plays a role in allocating fixed phone lines. Overall, the infrastructure questions provide a fairly consistent picture in which China looks better than the other three countries.
The survey questionnaire has a series of questions on financial services. Again, in all of these countries the government stake in the banking sector is dominant. On the question of whether firms have overdraft facilities, the responses range from a low of 18% in China, to 23%
in Pakistan, to 31% in Ethiopia, to a high of 66% in Bangladesh. The share of firms with a loan from a bank or financial institution also varies quite a bit across these countries. Average clearance times for checks ranges from 2 days in Ethiopia or Pakistan to nearly 5 days in China.
In our China sample, there are a lot of private medium-sized firms, and the data reveal that in general they are not receiving good services from the largely state-owned financial system. In summary, across these countries and within these countries there is very significant variation in many of the investment climate measures, so that the potential is there to explain differences in firm performance based on variation in the investment climate across locations. In subsequent sections in which we relate investment climate indicators to firm performance, the five measures highlighted in bold in Table 1 3 emerge consistently as important determinants of performance, so we focus the discussion on them. But some of these measures are quite highly correlated, so in the empirical analysis we are aware that individual indicators may be proxying for broader problems. As a group, however, the five indicators cover the range of governance problems that firms typically find burdensome. Also, while in general the indicators are correlated, there are interesting patterns across the countries. China, for example, looks very good in infrastructure related areas such as power reliability, access to phone lines, and speedy customs clearance; at the same time its private firms are not well served by the governmentowned financial system and are exposed to a burdensome regulatory and inspections regime.
In our empirical analysis, we are going to treat the investment climate as exogenous to firms. We have tried to develop questions that objectively measure the investment climate.
Nevertheless, there may be endogeneity problems resulting from firm performance affecting these measures. For example, it is possible that an especially efficient firm can work within the exogenously given environment to reduce inspections, or power losses, or days for customs clearance or phone lines. To address this potential, we average the indicators across firms of a common sector in a particular location. So, for example, we take an average of these indicators for garment firms in Dhaka, and that sector-location mean enters the empirical analysis. 
Investment Climate and Firm Performance: the Case of Garments
To isolate and test for the importance of the investment climate on firm performance, we begin by comparing firms producing similar goods with similar technologies in different locations. Firms in the garment industry are good candidates: garments are clearly tradable goods, firms face common prices and the technology is fairly standard. Garment firms are well represented across the four countries, providing 575 firms for the analysis. As a first step, production functions are estimated to retrieve measures of total factor productivity (TFP). TFP is then related to differences in the investment climate across the firm locations. The indicators are collectively highly significant and indicate that firms in the best investment climate can be twice as productive as those in weaker environments. The next step is to examine if workers in areas with better investment climates share in the benefit from this higher productivity in the form of higher wages. On this second measure of firm performance, we again find that stronger investment climate indicators translate into higher wages. Finally, we confirm that profits or the return to capital is also higher in better investment climate locations. Table 2 reports the estimates of the production function for the garment firms. With three years of data for each firm, a random effects specification is used to capture possible unobserved heterogeneity across firms. Column 1 simply controls for the labor and capital inputs. While the capital used is tradable, there could be differences in the quality of workers that would not be captured in the simply quantity of workers. In column 2 the average schooling of workers within a plant is included to control for the quality of labor. The coefficient on education is significant and results in raising labor's coefficient. It should be noted that there is no evidence of unexploited economies of scale. In fact, there is some evidence of small diseconomies of scale.
In these regressions, the firms are pooled across countries. The validity of the assumption of a common technology is demonstrated in columns (3) and (4) where the coefficients are allowed to vary by country. It should be noted that there is no statistical difference in the coefficients across countries. Using the labor quality adjusted parameters (column (2)), the residuals are used to generate a measure of total factor productivity.
It has long been recognized, however, that there could be correlation between the levels of inputs and the unobserved firm-specific shocks in the estimation of production functions.
Firms that receive a positive productivity shock could respond by using higher levels of inputs.
If this is not controlled for, the parameter estimates -and thus the tfp measures -are biased.
This issue has been addressed by different methods. Some have proposed using fixed effects, but this requires a component of the productivity shock to be invariant over time. Instrumental variables is another option, but valid instruments are very hard to find. An alternative approach was first proposed by Olley and Pakes (1996) and adapted by Levinsohn and Petrin (2000) . The idea is instead to condition out a serially correlated unobserved productivity shock. The productivity shock is divided into two parts, one part is a state variable that affects firms' input decisions and the other is an i.i.d. component. Labor and intermediate inputs are considered to be freely variable while capital is a state variable that is assumed to adjust slowly to productivity shocks.
Thus, using the production function in logs (see equation (1) While the bias on the OLS coefficients is indeterminant, if labor is more likely to be correlated with the productivity shock, then the OLS coefficient on labor is likely to be overestimated and the OLS coefficient on capital is likely underestimated. The last column in Table 2 , column 5, shows the results of estimating the production function using the Levinsohn-Petrin technique. Labor's coefficient is now lower while that of capital is higher. The direction of the changes in these parameters is as expected and of a magnitude consistent with other studies (see Levinsohn-Petrin for additional references). Using these parameters, a second total factor productivity series is calculated. Both TFP series are then used when examining the role of the investment climate on firm performance. The higher coefficient on capital will have the effect of lowering the estimated productivity of capital-intensive firms. Thus, in comparing results between the two TFP series, Chinese firms, which tend to be more capital intensive, will likely have lower productivity in the second set of results. Using two different TFP series provides a robustness check on the results. Tables 3 and 4 , the investment climate indicators explain a significant share of the differences in productivity across locations, regardless of which TFP series is used for the analysis. Losses from an inconsistent power supply and delays in receiving telephone connections are particularly robust determinants of productivity. However, rather than place too much emphasis on a particular coefficient, we run Chi2 tests on the joint significance of the five investment climate indicators. In each case, one can reject the hypothesis that they are not jointly significant. The null is rejected at the 1% level for all the GLS estimates and at 2% for all the Levinsohn-Petrin estimates.
As reported in
The basic specification is augmented to include several geographic variables that have been hypothesized in the literature as important determinants of productivity and growth. The findings on the investment climate are robust to the inclusion of distances to ports and major markets as well as agglomeration measures (column 2).
4 These variables do not enter significantly themselves once the investment climate is controlled for. As a further robustness check, country dummies are included. Now, variation is being identified off differences within a country. While the significance of the investment climate variables declines somewhat, the joint significance is still strong.
Using the coefficients from the Levinsohn-Petrin estimation with country dummies (column 3), we conduct a thought experiment. We want to know what type of productivity boost firms in other countries would experience on average if their investment climate indicators were at the level of those achieved in China. The results are plausible and economically important.
On average, firms in Pakistan could experience a productivity gain of 63%, Bangladesh 108%
and Ethiopia 124% from such an improvement in their investment climates. The fact that all of these counterfactual changes are positive reveals that China has the best investment climate in terms of creating a good environment for productivity in the garment sector. Recall from section 3 that China was significantly better than Bangladesh in terms of power losses, customs clearance, and days to get a phone line, but worse in terms of inspections and financial services.
The results of the thought experiment show that China's advantages significantly outweigh its disadvantages in terms of creating a high productivity environment for garment firms.
Having shown that good infrastructure and efficient regulation can potentially double productivity in garments, we now address whether workers share in the benefits of working in a good investment climate location. Put another way, Bangladesh, despite its relatively poor investment climate compared to China, can successfully export garments and compete in tradables more generally, provided that it has lower wages. If its investment climate were to improve, this analysis shows how much wages could be expected to rise.
(Chittagong, Karachi, Guangzhou, Shanghai, Tianjin). The third geography variable that we use is population of the city, which indicates whether there is a large market in the immediate vicinity of the firm. Table 5 reports the results of regressing average wages on the investment climate variables and firm characteristics. We are assuming that labor markets are locally competitive, but that labor is immobile across these countries and probably has fairly limited mobility within these countries as well. Our prior is that the investment climate indicators should affect wages in the same direction as productivity. Years of schooling and the average experience of workers are controlled for, as are the size and age of the firm. These worker and firm characteristics are all highly significant determinants of wages and have the predictable relationships (Table 5 , column 1). The investment climate indicators collectively have a strong relationship with wages, with customs delays and delays getting a phone line having a particularly negative relationship with wages. As with TFP, we then control for distance from major markets, distance from the nearest port and the city's population in column 2. The population variable has the intuitive sign, although the relationship is only weakly significant. However, the collective significance of the investment climate variables remains very strong and the coefficients barely change with these controls added. The joint significance of the investment climate variables remains at 1% even with the inclusion of country dummies. Using the coefficients from this last specification, improving the better investment climate to that enjoyed by China would lead to wage increases of 22% in Bangladesh, 37% in Pakistan, and 43% in Ethiopia.
The large differences in productivity across locations and the relatively smaller wage premiums paid there, point to substantial profitability of firms in good investment climate locations. Table 6 reports on the link between the investment climate and the gross return to capital (specifically, gross profits relative to fixed assets). The joint significant of the investment climate variables is again strong and robust to the inclusion of the geography variables and the country dummies. Using the coefficients from column 3, the investment climate measures account for a difference in the return to capital, relative to China, of 67% for Pakistan, 82% for Bangladesh, and 121% for Ethiopia.
Investment Climate and Growth
We saw in the previous section that the investment climate indicators that we have collected are systematically related to TFP, wages, and profit rates in the garment industry. The indicators collectively are highly significant, and the magnitudes of the coefficients are plausible:
they suggest that China has the best investment climate of the four countries and that its better investment climate leads to TFP advantages of 63% over Pakistani firms, 108% over
Bangladeshi firms, and 124% over Ethiopian firms. The better investment climate leads to both higher wages and higher returns to capital. As discussed in section 2, the higher return to capital, other things equal, should lead to faster accumulation and growth for the typical firm. In this section we introduce other outcome variables (growth rate of output, growth rate of employment, and growth rate of fixed assets) to see if there is in fact a consistent relationship with the investment climate indicators.
Estimating production functions for the other industries is something that we leave for future work. Some of the other industries are quite heterogeneous, creating problems for estimation; and garments is the sector for which we had the largest number of firms. As more surveys are completed, it will be possible to investigate whether the link between investment climate and TFP is similar across sectors. For the moment, we have shown that poor infrastructure and inefficient regulation reduce productivity in garments, and we take it as plausible that these factors are important for other sectors as well. We make this assumption so that we can bring in the data from all of the other industries in what follows.
In Table 7 we estimate an equation for the growth rate of firm output, across 3081 firms in different sectors. We include but do not report year dummies to take account of business cycles and industry dummies to take account of different output and price cycles in different lines of business. New firms tend to grow significantly faster; and there is always a strong negative relationship between lagged level of output and rate of growth of output (Column 1). Any random error in the level of output would tend to produce this pattern in the data; beyond that, it may reflect a steep learning curve as firms move from small levels of output to higher levels. After controlling for these firm characteristics, the investment climate indicators have a large effect on output growth: customs delays, power losses, and phone line delays all have large negative coefficients, and availability of overdraft facilities has a large positive one. The results weaken somewhat when we include distance from markets and ports, city population, and country dummies. The country dummies ensure that we are not simply picking up a spurious correlation between the fact that China has a good investment climate and also has dynamic firms. Even with country dummies the results are quite strong: we can reject at the 1% level the hypothesis that the coefficients on all of the investment climate indicators are zero. If we apply the coefficients from Column 3 to the actual difference between the mean investment climate in China and the mean climate in Bangladesh, the estimated impact of the better investment climate in China is 3.7 percentage points of growth.
We get similar results explaining employment growth (table 8) . Employment growth is negatively related to age of the firm and initial employment level. Beyond that, investment climate matters, especially power losses and to a lesser extent customs delays and availability of overdraft facilities. The results are robust to including geography variables (column 2).
However, this is the one equation in which the inclusion of country dummies reduces the joint significance of the investment climate indicators below conventional significance levels (column 3). Using the coefficients in column 3, the estimated impact of the investment climate difference between China and Bangladesh is a difference in employment growth rates of 4.6 percentage points. We showed in the previous section that incumbent workers receive some of the benefits of a good investment climate in the form of higher wages. In addition, there is some evidence that better investment climate spurs faster growth of employment, though the relationship is not statistically significant when country dummies are included. We take it that there is in each of these countries a fairly large poor of rural labor that would move to the big cities covered in our surveys provided that there is employment at a urban wage that is above rural returns to labor.
We also estimate an equation for the growth rate of fixed assets (table 9) . Here, a couple of our control variables turn out to be very important. In column 2, being far from major markets is bad for investment (with a t-statistic of 13). Alternatively, country dummies (column 3) are highly significant in this equation. After controlling for other factors, including the investment climate indicators, the growth rate of fixed assets is much higher in China than in the other countries. The decision to expand fixed assets has long-term consequences so it is plausible that political stability or other national level characteristics (size of market) are especially important in this calculation. Beyond those factors, a couple of the investment climate measures have the right sign and statistical significance (number of inspection visits, availability of overdraft facilities). Collectively the investment climate indicators are significant at the 1% level.
Conclusions
Investment climate matters for the level of productivity, wages, and profit rates, and for the growth rates of output, employment, and capital stock at the firm level. We see these results
as consistent with the larger literature on the importance of institutions and policies for economic growth. Our contribution is to collect data from a large number of firms in order to see how weak institutions actually affect the environment in which firms operate and to investigate the importance of local governance. Most of the existing work on the relationship between institutions and growth assumes that the important institutions are constant within a country.
The empirical link that we establish between investment climate indicators and firm performance is robust to the inclusion of country dummies, which reveals that there is significant variation in the investment climate across locations within countries. So, local governance is important.
In our presentation we have stressed the joint significance of the investment climate indicators and the fact that together they predict performance differences across locations whose magnitudes are both plausible and important. As more surveys are completed and the sample size grows, it will be possible to gain more confidence about the importance of specific aspects of the investment climate. Where we stand on this at the moment is summarized in Table 10 , which shows which of the indicators has a p-value of at least .15 in which equation (focusing here on what we view as the "most conservative" specification, the one that includes country dummies). The delay in getting a phone line comes through as the most significant bottleneck, significant in four of the six equations. Beyond that, customs delays and losses through power outages are also important -each significant in three equations. This suggests that the government's role in providing a good regulatory framework for infrastructure and access to the international market is particularly important. The inspection burden and availability of overdraft facilities (our proxy for financial services more generally) are significant in two equations each.
Looking to the future, there are a number of directions for further work, all of which will be easier as more of these investment climate surveys are completed. First, it will be useful to estimate production functions for sectors other than garments, to confirm whether or not investment climate affects productivity similarly in different industries. Second, as more data are collected it will be possible to get a better fix on exactly which aspects of the investment climate are important. Finally, we plan to sponsor repeat surveys (rolling panels) on about a three-year cycle. Many of the institutional features that we are capturing are likely to be quite persistent. On the other hand, there are communities around the world that are deliberately trying to create a better environment for entrepreneurship and productivity, so gradually we should be able to find time-series variation in the investment climate and to investigate the question of whether, within a location, improvements in the investment climate lead to higher productivity, factor returns, and growth. We hope that these surveys will be a useful tool for communities that are trying to improve their investment climates, helping them to benchmark themselves against other locations and to measure their progress over time.
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